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IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF 
GLOBAL DATA SECURITY AND PRIVACY: 
THE TERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF THE 
STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT AND THE 
MICROSOFT CASE 
Russell Hsiao* 
It is the year 2020. The Chinese government has demanded that Google, the 
owner and operator of Gmail, a web-based e-mail service, turn over to local 
law enforcement authorities the metadata and contents in e-mail accounts of 
two individuals. The two targets of this demand are both Chinese citizens and 
well-known human rights activists.1 One person received a human rights award 
in the West for her courageous struggle for democracy in the Xinjiang Uyghur 
Autonomous Region, and the other is her lawyer. Beijing claims both have 
broken domestic law by allegedly conducting “unlawful” protests in front of a 
central government office. The pair is ostensibly challenging the government’s 
heavy-handed tactics in China’s restive western region. The Ministry of Public 
Security abides by domestic laws and protocols, which grants them the legal 
authority to acquire all records from the e-mail accounts for further criminal 
investigation.2 Upon receiving the Chinese government’s request, Google’s 
                                                 
* J.D. Candidate 2016, The Catholic University of America’s Columbus School of Law; 
B.A. International Studies with University Honors, 2005, American University. The author 
would like to thank Professor Chris Savage for serving as the expert reader and members of 
the journal’s editorial board for reviewing earlier drafts. He may be reached at 
22hsiao@cua.law.edu. 
 1 Assume for the purpose of this intellectual exercise that the awards were conferred by 
the U.S. Government; a recognition meant to highlight the differences in values between the 
two governments and how such differences could affect our judgment. Furthermore, also 
consider, or assume for the matter of this exercise), that there were news reports that some 
Uyghur may be receiving training in neighboring Pakistan with known terrorist groups and 
could be plotting violent attacks against the Chinese government. See, e.g., Michael Wines, 
China Says Region’s Attackers Trained in Pakistan, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2011, at A3. 
 2 In late 2014, the Chinese government announced a Draft Counterterror Law requiring 
companies to keep servers and user data within China, supply law enforcement authorities 
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response team quickly tracks the location of the data, and determines that the 
accounts’ metadata—or non-content information—is stored in computer serv-
ers in China. This practice is consistent with Beijing’s data localization and 
retention rules, however, the content of the e-mails—the content of the com-
munications—are stored in servers in the United States. 
Across the Pacific, in a similar fashion U.S. law enforcement lawfully ac-
quires a warrant from a judge to search and demand the production of e-mails 
of an American citizen with suspected ties to a murderous drug cartel. The 
metadata, or e-mail header information (i.e., “From:,” “To:”, “CC:,” and 
Timestamp fields of the e-mails),3 of the subject’s e-mails are stored in servers 
located within the United States. However, as a result of the company’s data 
routing and server architecture, a complex, and confidential system proprietary 
to the company, Google’s databases are spread throughout the United States 
and worldwide.4 In the case of the drug suspect the contents of the e-mails, 
such as the subject line and body, are stored in servers physically located in 
Russia.5 
How should Google respond to the requests of the Chinese and American 
governments? Is Google legally obligated to turn over the foreign-stored data 
to the local authorities? Should Google be legally obligated to turn over the 
foreign-stored data in response to a unilateral demand by a government? 
The latter hypothetical scenario parallels an actual case now before the Se-
cond Circuit Court of Appeals. In Microsoft v. United States, prosecutors at the 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) sought and obtained a warrant in 2013 for the 
information contained in a Microsoft Outlook account.6 The requested infor-
                                                                                                                 
with communications records and censor terrorism-related Internet content.  A second draft 
of the law was released in late February 2015 (See, e.g., Reuters, China Draft Counterterror 
Law Strikes Fear in Foreign Tech Firms, RE/CODE (Feb. 27, 2015), 
http://recode.net/2015/02/27/china-draft-counterterror-law-strikes-fear-in-foreign-tech-
firms/?utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=e-mail&utm_campaign=rc_e-
mail_daily&utm_content=china-draft-counterterror-law-strikes-fear-in-foreign-tech-firms. 
 3 Reading full e-mail headers, GOOGLE.COM, 
https://support.google.com/mail/answer/29436?hl=en (last visited Mar. 8, 2015). 
 4 James C. Corbett, et al., Spanner: Google’s Globally-Distributed Database, GOOGLE, 
INC., http://static.googleusercontent.com/media/research.google.com/en//archive/spanner-
osdi2012.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2015). 
 5 See generally United States v. Gorshkov, 2001 WL 1024026, at *3 (W.D. Wash. May 
23, 2001) (finding the Fourth Amendment does not apply to FBI agents’ “extraterritorial 
access to computers in Russia and their copying of data contained thereon.”). 
 6 Kathleen Porter, Microsoft Versus the Federal Government: Round Three, ROBINSON 
& COLE (Apr. 9, 2015), http://www.dataprivacyandsecurityinsider.com/2015/04/microsoft-
versus-the-federal-government-round-three/; see also In re A Warrant to search a Certain E-
mail Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp. (In re Microsoft), 15 F.Supp.3d 
466 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
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mation was stored in computer servers based in Dublin, Ireland.7 Microsoft 
challenged the legality of the warrant,8 arguing that since it was issued by the 
court under the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”), it can only apply to data 
stored within the United States.9 The District Court, however, sustained the 
warrant authorizing the search and held Microsoft in contempt for then failing 
to produce the data.10 Microsoft appealed the District Court’s ruling before the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals, which heard the case on September 9, 2015.11 
As of this publication, a decision has not been reached.12 
A handful of articles have addressed the issues surrounding whether the 
SCA, as written, applies to data stored outside the United States. From one 
perspective, the dispute revolves around the proper interpretation of the SCA’s 
meaning and how extraterritoriality principles apply to that statute.13 However, 
the practical implications of the dispute extend well beyond statutory interpre-
tation.14 The practical issues include the policy implications of an extraterrito-
rial application of the SCA on relations between the United States and other 
countries, and on the business models and  profitability of major U.S. corporate 
entities such as Microsoft, Google, and Amazon.15 
                                                 
 7 In re Microsoft, 15 F.Supp.3d 466. 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Sam Thielman, Microsoft case: DOJ says it can demand every email from any US-
based provider, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 9, 2015, 4:06 PM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/sep/09/microsoft-court-case-hotmail-ireland-
search-warrant. 
 12 See Porter, supra note 6. 
 13 Compare Orin S. Kerr, What Legal Protections Apply to E-mail Stored Outside the 
U.S.?, WASH. POST: THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 7, 2014) [hereinafter Kerr, Legal Pro-
tections], https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/07/25/more-
on-privacy-rights-in-e-mail-stored-outside-u-s/ (stating that the SCA is generally thought to 
apply only inside the United States) with Jennifer Daskal, The Microsoft Warrant Case: A 
Response to Orin Kerr, JUST SEC. (Sept. 3, 2015, 3:28 PM), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/25801/microsoft-warrant-case-response-orin-kerr/ (determin-
ing that both parties and two judges have agreed that this case is about whether the SCA 
applies outside of the United States); see also Privacy Law – Stored Communications Act – 
District Court Holds that SCA Warrant Obligates U.S. Provider to Produce Emails Stored 
on Foreign Servers – In re Warrant to Search a Certain Email Account Controlled & Main-
tained by Microsoft Corp., 128 HARV. L. REV. 1019, 1023-26 (2015); see also Andrew 
Fields, Lowering the Temperature on the Microsoft-Ireland Case, LAWFARE (Sept. 11, 2015, 
10:10 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/lowering-temperature-microsoft-ireland-case 
(implying that if Microsoft loses it will not change the meaning of the SCA or be a blow to 
internet privacy and state sovereignty) 
 14 Thielman, supra note 11. 
 15 Jennifer Daskal, Case To Watch : Microsoft v. US on the Extraterritorial Reach of the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act, JUST SEC. (Mar. 6, 2015, 1:13 PM), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/20780/case-watch-microsoft-v-united-states-extraterritorial-
reach-electronic-communications-privacy-act. 
218 THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY [Vol. 24.1 
JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY 
In light of these considerations, some commentators have described the de-
cision by the DOJ to attempt to obtain the e-mail content by means of an 
American court-issued warrant, as opposed to the utilization of diplomatic 
channels through a “Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty” (“MLAT”), as a “policy 
choice.”16 The assertion that warrant usage is a “policy decision”—with the 
implication that the choice is not strictly a legal one to be resolved by the 
courts—foreshadows the challenges facing the U.S. and other nations in deal-
ing with this issue. Indeed, the issues relevant to this case also touches on how 
governments will reconcile differing norms and values between legal systems, 
competing foreign policy goals, and economic interests.17 To date, the interna-
tional policy implications of data globalization—the unfettered flow of 
knowledge in the form of data-packets crossing borders on the Internet—
remain unsettled.18 
Against the backdrop of increased tensions between governments over 
cyber-conflicts in cyberspace, such as cyber-espionage19 and government sur-
veillance,20 the issues of data nationalism21 and territorial jurisdiction over ac-
tivities in cyberspace are causing more international friction than ever.22 Some 
                                                 
 16 Jonah F. Hill, Problematic Alternatives: MLAT Reform for the Digital Age, HARV. 
NAT’L SEC. J. (Jan. 28, 2015, 1:05 PM), http://harvardnsj.org/2015/01/problematic-
alternatives-mlat-reform-for-the-digital-age/ (explaining “DOJ made a policy choice to seek 
a warrant rather than using the MLAT process, based in large part on concerns about the 
efficacy of the MLAT system and the potential for a drawn-out waiting period”). 
 17 See In re A Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained by 
Microsoft Corp., 15 F.Supp. 3d 466, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (stating Microsoft contends that 
the United States does not have the authority to issue a warrant which requires extraterritori-
al search and seizure); see also Jonah F. Hill, supra note 16 (noting that Microsoft would 
rather the request for data to go through MLAT, otherwise having to comply with multiple 
requests and in multiple jurisdictions would be unduly burdensome). 
 18 There is no set definition of data globalization. The author uses it to describe the idea 
of “unfettered knowledge flow” by analogy to globalization in trade, which generally means 
the removal of trade barriers. 
 19 The estimated annual cost of cybercrime and economic espionage to the world econ-
omy ranges from $445 billion to $1 trillion. See Ellen Nakashima & Andrea Peterson, Re-
port: Cybercrime and espionage costs $445 billion annually, WASH. POST (June 9, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/report-cybercrime-and-espionage-
costs-445-billion-annually/2014/06/08/8995291c-ecce-11e3-9f5c-9075d5508f0a_story.html. 
 20 Glenn Greenwald et al., Edward Snowden: the whistleblower behind the NSA surveil-
lance revelations, THE GUARDIAN, (June 11, 2013, 9:00 AM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/09/edward-snowden-nsa-whistleblower-
surveillance. In 2013, former federal government contractor Edward Snowden leaked a 
trove of classified materials revealing extensive government surveillance programs covering 
both American and non-American communications. Id. 
 21 DANIEL CASTRO, THE INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND., THE FALSE PROMISE OF 
DATA NATIONALISM 10 (2013). 
 22 For instance, China’s Internet czar Lu Wei, director of the State Internet Information 
Office, has repeatedly called on the United States to respect China’s cyber sovereignty. See, 
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governments have already enacted or are considering new data security and 
privacy measures, such as data localization laws that require data collecting 
Internet companies to store the collected data on servers physically located 
within the country.23 For instance, Russia enacted a new law effective as of 
September 1, 2015, requiring Internet companies to locate their computer serv-
ers that contain personal information on Russian citizens within the country’s 
borders.24 Developments such as this led some legal scholars, such as Colum-
bia Law Professor Tim Wu25 to predict the “Balkanization” of the Internet26—
the fragmentation of the Internet into separate, nationalized segments.27 Ac-
tions such as those of the U.S. government in the Microsoft case, claiming the 
right to directly gain access to data not physically stored within its territory, 
may inadvertently encourage this trend. 
These concerns do not mean a government lacks legitimate interests or 
should be foreclosed from obtaining digital evidence that may be stored out-
side the jurisdiction of its courts or otherwise outside the government’s territo-
rial control. Efficient acquisition of data is increasingly critical for criminal 
investigations that transcend national borders, and in some cases national secu-
rity, as more data goes online and is only obtainable by digital means.28 How-
ever, the efficiency of MLAT arrangements is questionable, even in cases be-
tween friendly nations with shared values such as democracy and human 
rights, as is the case of Microsoft between the United States and Ireland. Factor 
in the reality that some of the United States’ largest trading partners do not 
                                                                                                                 
e.g., Lu Wei, Cyber Sovereignty Must Rule Global Internet, HUFF. POST (Feb. 14, 2015, 5:59 
AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lu-wei/china-cyber-sovereignty_b_6324060.html. 
 23 For a detailed discussion about the challenges of data nationalism, see Castro, supra 
note 21. 
 24 Deadline for Compliance with Russian Localization Law Set for September 1, 2015, 
PRIV. & INFO. SEC. L. BLOG (Jan. 2, 2015), 
https://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/2015/01/articles /deadline-for-compliance-with-
russian-localization-law-set-for-september-1-2015/. 
 25 Professor Tim Wu is the author of The Master Switch: The Rise and Fall of Infor-
mation Empires. The book offers a detailed account about the characters involved in the rise 
and fall of information empires, from the telephone, to the radio and television, and the In-
ternet, within the United States. See generally TIM WU, THE MASTER SWITCH: THE RISE AND 
FALL OF INFORMATION EMPIRES 168-75 (2010). 
 26 Bob Davis, Rise of Nationalism Frays Global Ties, WALL ST. J., Apr. 28, 2008, at 
A16 (statement of Tim Wu, law professor at Columbia University) (“‘We’re facing a step-
by-step Balkanization of the global Internet…It’s becoming a series of national net-
works.’”). 
 27 See generally Robert Pringle, Balkanization, ENCYC. BRIT., 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/50323/Balkanization (last visited Sept. 22, 
2015). 
 28 NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., SPECIAL PUB. 800-86, GUIDE TO INTEGRATING 
FORENSIC TECHNIQUES INTO INCIDENT RESPONSE, at ES-1, 3-2 (2006), 
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-86/SP800-86.pdf. 
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share similar values and may even be considered competitors in the political 
and military arenas, a warrant issued by a U.S. judge, sworn to uphold strict 
legal standards, to obtain data residing in a foreign nation—even if that entails 
recovering data from overseas—may be the best among worst options. To be 
sure, the courts’ eventual resolution of the dispute in Microsoft v. United 
States, will have policy implications that go well beyond the narrow legal issue 
that the case presents on the surface. 
This Note discusses the legal and policy implications of Microsoft v. United 
States. Part I provides technical background on how electronic mail, or e-mail, 
works. Part II presents an overview of the relevant provisions of the SCA and 
the different legal instruments, including warrants, subpoenas, and court or-
ders, available to law enforcement under the statute. Part III reviews the proce-
dural history of the Microsoft case, as well as the legal and policy positions 
taken by the government and Microsoft. Part IV weighs the parties’ arguments, 
analyzes the efficacy of the available legal instruments, presents the lower 
court’s ruling, and ultimately offers a new framework for handling digital evi-
dence in the case of cross-border data transfers and law enforcement coopera-
tion. 
As the Internet continues to expand, evolve, and connect more people 
online, the cross-border data transfers that make it possible are increasingly 
important with respect to economic activity, social and military communica-
tions, and law enforcement purposes. This Note argues that the resolution of 
the Microsoft case will have profound implications for the evolution of the In-
ternet in general and particularly, the use of e-mail, sparking a robust conversa-
tion about the concept of sovereignty in cyberspace, and whether it exists in 
this new paradigm.29 
I. ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS AND THE INTERNET 
A thorough legal analysis of stored electronic communications is enhanced 
by a background discussion about the evolution of electronic communications 
and the nature of the Internet.30 Like the Internet itself, e-mail was born in the 
Pentagon-sponsored Advanced Research Projects Agency Network program—
more commonly known as “ARPANET.” The ARPANET is a linked network 
of computers in government sponsored research labs hosted at universities and 
                                                 
 29 Mark Scott, Ireland Lends Support to Microsoft in Email Privacy Case, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 24, 2014, 5:44 AM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/12/24/ireland-lends-support-
to-microsoft-in-email-privacy-case. 
 30 For an overview of the history the Internet, see generally WU, supra note 25. 
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firms throughout the United States.31 The inception of e-mail is described by 
some Internet historians as a “found art” or a “lucky accident;” 32 the first pro-
gram for sending electronic messages within a specific computer, via a time-
sharing system, was invented in the early 1960s.33 This early system permitted 
researchers using a time-sharing-enabled computer to send short electronic 
messages to one another that only the addressed recipient could read.34 
The first electronic-mail delivery system between two computers was pro-
grammed in 1972 by engineer Ray Tomlinson at the technology firm, Bolt 
Beranek and Newman.35 Prior to Tomlinson’s simple but ingenious program, 
electronic messages could only be sent and received within a single time-
sharing-enabled computer.36 Tomlinson’s program built on an existing file 
transfer protocol (“FTP”) that he worked on called “CPYNET,” which allowed 
a computer user to transfer computer files to another computer within the net-
work.37 The same year, an APRANET programmer at MIT, Abhay Bhushan, 
included Tomlinson’s e-mail program into ARPANET’s FTP.38 Historians of 
the Internet proclaimed that “[e]-mail was to the ARPANET what the Louisi-
ana Purchase was to the young United States.”39 Indeed, ARPANET took Tom-
linson’s idea of transferring mail messages via FTP and expanded it one-
hundred-fold. 
A. The Meteoric Rise of E-mail 
Today, e-mail is the most ubiquitous professional and personal means of 
communications.40 Obviously, this was not always the case. In early 1976, four 
                                                 
 31 See KATIE HAFNER AND MATTHEW LYON, WHERE WIZARDS STAY UP LATE: THE ORI-
GINS OF THE INTERNET 187 (1996). 
 32 See id. at 189 (“The ARPANET’s creators didn’t have a grand vision for the inven-
tion of an earth-circling message-handling system.”). 
 33 Due to its high costs and limited capacity, “time-sharing” was a groundbreaking 
‘hack’ of early computers that permitted multiple researchers to share the processing capaci-
ty of a single computer system. See id. at 190. 
 34 BARRY M. LEINER, ET AL., INTERNET SOC’Y, BRIEF HISTORY OF THE INTERNET 2-3 
(2012), http://www.internetsociety.org/sites/default/files/Brief_History_of_the_Internet.pdf. 
 35 HAFNER & LYON, supra note 31, at 191 (“The first electronic-mail delivery engaging 
two machines was done one day in 1972 by a quiet engineer, Ray Tomlinson at BBN.”). 
 36 Id. at 190. 
 37 See J. POSTEL & J. REYNOLDS, INTERNET ENG’G TASK FORCE, RFC 959, File Transfer 
Protocol (FTP) 1 (1985), https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc959.txt (noting that the objectives of 
FTP include: the promotion of the sharing of files [computer programs and/or data] and the 
encouragement of indirect or implicit [via programs] use of remote computers); see also 
HAFNER & LYON, supra note 31, at 191. 
 38 Id. at 191-192. 
 39 HAFNER & LYON, supra note 31, at 189. 
 40 The First E-mail Message of Ray Tomlinson, HIST. OF COMP., http://history-
computer.com/Internet/Maturing/Tomlinson.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2015). 
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years after CPYNET,41 ARPANET hosted 98 sites and was processing approx-
imately 9,800 e-mails per day.42 Meanwhile, the United States Postal Service 
(“USPS”) was handling 50 billion items of first-class mail a year,43 which 
translates roughly to about 137 million items per day—more than a thousand 
times the rate of e-mail messages. Twenty years later, in 1996, individual sites 
were capable of processing 150,000 e-mail messages every day.44 In 2013, 
nearly another 20 years later, roughly 183 billion e-mails were sent each day.45 
The USPS recognized the challenges from e-mail to traditional mail corre-
spondences from the very beginning. “We are being bypassed technological-
ly,” lamented an assistant U.S. Postmaster General at the beginning of 1976—
referencing the emergence of e-mails.46 Government studies published during 
that time recommended adding e-mail to the services of the Post Office.47 
However, government regulators ultimately decided to adopt a free market 
approach and to refrain from creating any significant government role in 
providing e-mail services.48 
Early on, the Advanced Research Projects Agency (“ARPA”) manage-
ment—the predecessor of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(“DARPA”)—recognized the surprising success and future importance, of e-
mail.49 An internal report from the late 1970s sent by the Information Pro-
cessing Techniques Office (“IPTO”) to ARPA management stated, 
The largest single surprise of the ARPANET program has been the incredible popular-
ity and success of network mail. There is little doubt that the techniques of network 
mail developed in connection with the ARPANET program are going to sweep the 
country and drastically change the techniques used for intercommunication in the pub-
lic and private sectors.50 
                                                 
 41 Id. 
 42 HAFNER & LYON, supra note 31, at 211 (“MIT was a typical site, and by extrapola-
tion, if one machine processed about a hundred pieces of e-mail a day, multiplied by a factor 
of 98 or so (the number of hosts then on the Net).”). 
 43 Id. (“…electronic mail didn’t yet appear to pose a threat to the U.S. postal system 
[that] … handled more than 50 billion pieces of first-class mail a year.”). 
 44 Id. 
 45 JUSTIN LEVENSTEIN, THE RADICATI GRP., INC., EMAIL STATISTICS REPORT: 2013-2017 
– EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (Sara Radicati ed., 2013), http://www.radicati.com/wp/wp-
content/uploads/2013/04/Email-Statistics-Report-2013-2017-Executive-Summary.pdf; see 
also Marshall Brain & Tim Crosby, How E-mail Works, HOWSTUFFWORKS, 
http://computer.howstuffworks.com/e-mail-messaging/e-mail6.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 
2015) (stating that a market research firm found that more then 183 billion emails were 
being sent in a day). 
 46 HAFNER & LYON, supra note 31, at 212. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. at 213. 
 49 Id. at 214. 
 50 Id. 
2015] Implications for the Future of Global Data Security & Privacy 223 
The managers at IPTO were correct in their prediction about the disruptive 
effects of e-mail. 
B. How E-mail Works 
Initially, different computer programs and operating systems handled e-mail 
differently.51 This led to compatibility issues for network operators.52 If a read-
er’s mail handling program is incompatible with the sender’s program, mes-
sages might be unreadable, or simply dropped.53 Indeed, “[w]hen one mail 
handler couldn’t parse [e-mail] headers sent by others, it was as if a postal 
clerk in Keosha, Wisconsin, were being asked to deliver letters addressed in 
Sanskrit and Arabic.”54 The technical challenges grew exponentially as the 
number of mail programs ballooned and the number of connected nodes on the 
Internet grew.55 A common standard to permit different programs to handle 
electronic messages was sorely lacking but clearly critical for the efficient 
functioning and viability of the nascent electronic messaging system.56 
1. POP3, IMAP, and STMP 
Today, there are several different Internet standards for delivering and re-
trieving e-mails. Three of the most popular are POP3, IMAP, and SMTP, 
which exist at the application layer of Internet protocols.57 
The Post Office Protocol (“POP3”) is used by local e-mail clients running 
on individual computers to retrieve e-mail from a remote server over an Inter-
net connection.58 IMAP, or “Internet Message Access Protocol,” is a more ad-
vanced Internet protocol that permits users to access e-mails on multiple devic-
es.59 IMAP accomplishes this by commanding that the data representing the e-
mail messages remain on the remote e-mail server.60 This stored data can be 
accessed by and downloaded by multiple devices, such as a work computer, a 
                                                 
 51 Id. at 199. 
 52 HAFNER & LYON, supra note 31, at 200. 
 53 Id. at 199. 
 54 Id. at 198. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. at 197 (“imagine a local post office somewhere … making up its own rules for 
addressing, packaging, stamping, and starting mail … invent its won set of ZIP codes …”). 
 57 There are four layers in Internet protocols: application, transport, Internet, and link. 
See, e.g., Henrik Frystyk, The Internet Protocol Stack, WORLD WIDE WEB CONSORT. (July 1, 
1994), http://www.w3.org/People/Frystyk/thesis/TcpIp.html. 
 58 Brain & Crosby, supra note 45. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. 
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home computer, and a smartphone.61 IMAP also enables the user to organize e-
mail into folders;62 the folder structure is maintained on the server as well.63 
With IMAP, when a user searches for an e-mail, the search is commanded by 
the user’s device with the data containing the message is located on the as-
signed server, not the user’s local device.64 
Most if not all modern e-mail clients and servers support POP3 and IMAP, 
which are the two most prevalent Internet standard protocols for e-mail retriev-
al.65 Many webmail service providers such as Gmail, Outlook, and Yahoo! 
Mail either use IMAP or POP3 to allow e-mails to be downloaded to a local 
device.66 Unless specified by the user to the e-mail client to do otherwise, the 
POP3 server will generally delete the messages from the server.67 
Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (“SMTP”) is the most widely used Internet 
protocol for delivering e-mail client-side, on a local machine mail applica-
tions.68 These applications typically use SMTP for sending outbound messages 
to a mail server for relaying.69 For receiving messages, client applications typi-
cally  either use the POP3 or IMAP protocols discussed above.70 Moreover, 
there are proprietary Internet Protocol (“IP”) systems—such as Microsoft Ex-
change71—and webmail systems, like Hotmail, Gmail, or Yahoo! Mail, which 
use their own non-standard protocols to access e-mail accounts on their own 
mail servers as an alternative to POP3.72 However, all webmail systems, use 
SMTP when sending or receiving e-mail from outside their own systems.73 
For the purpose of this Note, it will be instructive to briefly describe what 
happens when someone sends an e-mail message. When someone clicks 
“send” on an e-mail, the sender’s e-mail client connects to the SMTP mail 
server that the user has associated with the e-mail account.74 The e-mail client 
exchanges data with the SMTP server, transmitting the addresses of the sender 
and recipient, the body of the message, and other information.75 The SMTP 
                                                 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Brain & Crosby, supra note 45. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Electronic mail servers and other mail transfer agents use SMTP to send and receive 
mail messages. See id. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Brain & Crosby, supra note 45. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. 
 73 See id. 
 74 Id. (explaining what happens when a client sends an e-mail). 
 75 Id. 
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server takes the “to” address, such as johndoe@example.com, and breaks it 
into two parts—the recipient’s unique identifier (e.g., the “name”) to the left of 
the “@” symbol and the domain name to the right of the symbol.76 If the recip-
ient is in the same domain as the sender, the e-mail delivery server would 
simply hand the message to its retrieval server—the POP3 or IMAP systems as 
detailed earlier.77  If the recipient is at another domain, then the SMTP server 
will relay the data representing the e-mail message to that domain.78 To accom-
plish this, the delivery server sends a signal to a Domain Name Server 
(“DNS”) to obtain the IP address of the receiver server for the recipient’s e-
mail domain.79  The DNS replies with one or more IP addresses for the SMTP 
server associated with the recipient’s domain.80  The sender’s e-mail delivery 
server then connects with the recipient’s retrieval server for the recipient’s e-
mail domain, and transfers the message to the recipient server.81 The recipient 
server, if it recognizes the recipient’s domain name, then transfers the message 
to the recipient e-mail domain’s POP3 server, which puts the message in the 
appropriate mailbox.82 
II. THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT 
E-mail communications are subject to certain privacy protections under 
United States law.83 The Stored Communications Act (“SCA”) governs the 
privacy rights of individuals and legal obligations of electronic communica-
tions service providers, such as Microsoft’s Outlook e-mail service, with re-
spect to disclosure of information regarding  stored communications, including 
both the content of e-mails and associated addressing and account infor-
mation.84 The SCA was passed as part of the Electronic Communications Pri-
vacy Act (“ECPA”) of 1986 and is codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712.85 
                                                 
 76 Brain & Crosby, supra note 45. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 See How does email work? A simple (illustrated) explanation, VISION DESIGN GRP. 
(Feb. 24, 2010), https://www.visiondesign.com/how-does-email-work-a-simple-illustrated-
explanation (explaining the process of sending outgoing emails). 
 80 Brain & Crosby, supra note 45. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. 
 83 CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41733, PRIVACY: AN OVERVIEW OF THE 
ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY ACT 1 (2012), 
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41733.pdf. 
 84 See Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 (2012); see also Orin S. 
Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and A Legislator’s Guide to 
Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1208 (2004) [hereinafter Kerr, User’s Guide] 
(stating the SCA was enacted as a part of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act). 
 85 For a comprehensive overview of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, see 
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The SCA establishes three different ways that the government can obtain in-
formation from a service provider: a subpoena, court order, and/or warrant.86 
The instrument that the government uses matters because “[t]he instrument law 
enforcement agents utilize dictates both the showing that must be made to ob-
tain it and the type of records that must be disclosed in response.”87 A subpoe-
na requires the least in the way of a government showing of need for the in-
formation, but only provides access to basic account information and related 
material, not the content of e-mails.88 A warrant requires the most robust show-
ing but, if approved by a court, permits the government to fully access e-mail 
content.89 The court order procedure requires an intermediate showing by the 
government but provides less data than available under a warrant.90 This statu-
tory structure is designed to protect the privacy of Internet users.91 
Indeed, the SCA created “a set of Fourth Amendment-like privacy protec-
tions by statute, regulating the relationship between government investigators 
and service providers in possession of users’ private information.”92 As George 
Washington University Law Professor Orin Kerr aptly described: “The SCA 
acts as both a shield and a sword. On one hand, it has a provision forbidding 
providers to divulge communications unless an exception applies…on the oth-
er hand, one of the exceptions is a provision requiring providers to comply 
with the appropriate legal process.”93 In other words, “[a]s the Fourth Amend-
ment does not protect information  that individuals have voluntarily turned 
over to a third party…the SCA was passed to provide privacy protections that 
would otherwise be absent.”94 On the other hand, the SCA provides the gov-
ernment with three direct legal instruments to compel a provider to disclose 
certain personal records if it is necessary for criminal investigation.95 The Mi-
crosoft case deals with the disclosure of e-mail content, and the use of each of 
the statutory means to obtain the content of an e-mail is outlined below.96 
                                                                                                                 
Doyle, supra note 83, at 7-34. 
 86 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b). 
 87 In re Microsoft, 15 F.Supp.3d at 468. 
 88 See RICHARD M. THOMPSON II & JARED P. COLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44036, 
STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT: REFORM OF THE ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY 
ACT 5 (2015), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44036.pdf. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Kerr, User’s Guide, supra note 84, at 1219. 
 91 See S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 3-5 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3357-59 
(describing the legislative history of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act). 
 92 Kerr, User’s Guide, supra note 84, at 1212. 
 93 Kerr, Legal Protections, supra note 13. 
 94 Privacy Law – Stored Communications Act – District Court Holds that SCA Warrant 
Obligates U.S. Provider to Produce Emails Stored on Foreign Servers, supra note 13. 
 95 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b). 
 96 Privacy Law – Stored Communications Act – District Court Holds that SCA Warrant 
2015] Implications for the Future of Global Data Security & Privacy 227 
A. ADMINISTRATIVE SUBPOENA 
Under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(1)(B)(i), the contents of wire or electronic com-
munications in a remote computing service97 (“RCS”) that have been in storage 
for more than six months (180 days) may be obtained by the government “with 
prior notice from the governmental entity to the subscriber or customer if the 
governmental entity—(i) uses an administrative subpoena authorized by a 
Federal or State statute or a Federal or State grand jury or trial subpoena.”98  
Because obtaining e-mail content by means of a subpoena requires “prior no-
tice” to the subscriber,99 this will often not be an effective technique in the case 
of an ongoing criminal investigation of the sort at issue in Microsoft. 
B. COURT ORDER 
Under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), the content of wire or electronic communica-
tions in a remote computing service and records concerning electronic com-
munication service or remote computing service may be obtained by the gov-
ernment via a court order, “only if the governmental entity offers specific and 
articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the 
contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the records or other infor-
mation sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investiga-
tion”100 
                                                                                                                 
Obligates U.S. Provider to Produce Emails Stored on Foreign Servers, supra note 13. 
 97 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(1)(B)(i); 18 U.S.C. § 2711(2) (“[T]he term ‘remote computing 
service’ means the provision to the public of computer storage or processing services by 
means of an electronic communications system.”). 
 98 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(1)(B)(i). The content of e-mails less than six months old can 
only be obtained by means of a warrant.  18 U.S.C. § 2703(a).  One circuit has concluded 
that in the normal course users have a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the 
content of their e-mails generally, which means that under the Fourth Amendment (not, 
literally, under the SCA), a warrant is required for the government to obtain access to any e-
mails.  See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010).  The statute’s distinction 
between older and newer e-mails likely reflects Congress’s understanding of e-mail tech-
nology as it existed in 1986.  See Brief for Appellants, United States of America v. Steven 
Warshak, Harriet Warshak, and Tci Media, Inc., 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010) (No. 08-
3997); As discussed below, in Microsoft, the Government obtained a warrant, so the distinc-
tion is irrelevant in that context. 
 99 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(1)(B)(i)-(ii). 
 100 Moreover, “[a] court issuing an order pursuant to this section, on a motion made 
promptly by the service provider, may quash or modify such order, if the information or 
records requested are unusually voluminous in nature or compliance with such order other-
wise would cause an undue burden on such provider.” 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d). 
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C. WARRANT 
Under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a), the government may compel the production of 
content within an electronic communication in electronic storage, but only if it 
is pursuant to a warrant.101 Specifically: 
A governmental entity may require the disclosure by a provider of electronic commu-
nication service of the contents of a wire or electronic communication, that is in elec-
tronic storage in an electronic communications system for one hundred and eighty 
days or less, only pursuant to a warrant issued using the procedures described in the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (or, in the case of a State court, issued using 
State warrant procedures) by a court of competent jurisdiction.102 
The warrant provision within the SCA under 2703(a) also attaches the dis-
closure of stored contents of electronic communication covered by an adminis-
trative subpoena: 
A governmental entity may require the disclosure by a provider of electronic commu-
nications services of the contents of a wire or electronic communication that has been 
in electronic storage in an electronic communications system for more than one hun-
dred and eighty days by the means available under subsection (b) of this section.103 
III. MICROSOFT CORPORATION V. UNITED STATES 
On December 4, 2013, Magistrate Judge Francis of the U.S. District Court 
for the Southern District of New York issued a search warrant for a specified 
e-mail account maintained by Microsoft that was the subject of a criminal in-
vestigation.104 The warrant authorized, among other things, production of the 
“contents of all e-mails stored in the account, including copies of e-mails sent 
from the account.”105 
Microsoft’s Global Criminal Compliance (“GCC”) team, which is responsi-
ble for responding to search warrant requests for stored electronic information, 
complied with the warrant insofar as it called for the production of non-content 
information from the target account stored on servers within the United 
States.106 However, Microsoft determined that the account itself, along with the 
content of the e-mails, was hosted and stored in servers located within data 
centers in Ireland.107 Consequently, Microsoft moved to quash the search war-
rant, on the grounds that the warrant was invalid to the extent that it the re-
quired the retrieval of records from a server located outside the territory of the 
                                                 
 101 Id. § 2703(a). 
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 104 In re Microsoft, 15 F.Supp.3d at 467-68. 
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United States.108 According to Microsoft, that requirement amounted to an im-
permissible “extraterritorial” application of the warrant.109 
On April 25, 2014, Magistrate Judge Francis denied Microsoft’s motion.110 
Judge Francis ruled that “[e]ven when applied to information that is stored in 
servers abroad, an SCA Warrant does not violate the presumption against ex-
traterritorial application of American law.”111 On July 31, 2014, the District 
Court affirmed the Magistrate’s decision, but stayed enforcement of the ruling 
pending appeal.112 The Government then moved to lift the stay, which the Dis-
trict Court granted on August 29, 2014.113 Microsoft still refused to comply 
with the warrant, and was subsequently held in contempt by the District 
Court.114 The case was appealed to the Second Circuit, which heard this case on 
September 9, 2015; the court’s ruling has not yet been announced.115 
Like other American internet companies providing commercial e-mail ser-
vices, Microsoft stores customers’ e-mail messages in data centers, which are 
physical facilities containing clusters of networked computer servers that may 
be used for remote storage, processing, or electronic transmission of data.116 
Major commercial entities such as Microsoft maintain data centers both around 
the United States and abroad.117 Where a customer’s e-mail data is stored often, 
but not always, depends on which data center is closest to the user; this busi-
ness practice is undertaken in order to reduce network “latency,” which refers 
to the lag time between when a user requests information from the network and 
the time it is received.118 The greater the transmission distance between the 
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mail Accounts, REUTERS (Apr. 25, 2014, 6:41 PM), 
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 111 In re Microsoft, 15 F.Supp.3d at 477 (provides explanation about the ‘presumption 
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 112 Order Affirming the Decision of Magistrate Judge, In re Microsoft, 15 F.Supp.3d 466 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2014) (No. 80). 
 113 Memorandum and Order Granting the Government’s Motion to Lift the Stay of Exe-
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 114 Stipulation Regarding Contempt Order, In re Microsoft, 15 F.Supp.3d 466 (S.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 8, 2014) (No. 92). 
 115 Amended Notice of Appeal, In re Microsoft, 15 F.Supp.3d 466 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 
2014) (No. 95). 
 116 Margaret Rouse, data center definition, WHATIS.COM, 
http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/datacenterdefintion (last visited Mar. 8, 2015) (“A 
data center (sometimes spelled datacenter) is a centralized repository, either physical or 
virtual, for the storage, management, and dissemination of data and information organized 
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 117 In re Microsoft, 15 F.Supp.3d at 467. 
 118 Id.; see also Brief of Computer and Data Science Experts as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Appellant at 15, Microsoft Corp. vs. United States, No. 14-2985-cv (2d Cir. Dec. 15, 2014). 
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customer and the data center, the more latency will occur when delivering the 
requested data.119 Overall, latency is affected by the data’s travel distance, the 
transmission medium,120 and the number of switching points along the way, 
called “router hops”.121 In the case of Microsoft, the “country code” that a user 
enters when setting up an account may prompt the company to migrate the ac-
count’s information to a data center in or near the specified country.122 Other 
factors may also affect where the company chooses to store the account data. 
When an account is migrated to a server abroad, most of the “content” and 
some of the “non-content” information are subsequently deleted from the U.S. 
based servers.123 
The dispute in the Microsoft case does not involve any claim that the gov-
ernment failed to justify the issuance of the warrant per se.124 The dispute also 
does not involve any claim that it would be technically difficult for Microsoft, 
in the United States, to retrieve the data called for by the warrant from the dis-
tant server in Ireland.125 Instead, the legal and policy disputes relate to whether 
the SCA can or should properly be read to permit the issuance of warrants that 
                                                                                                                 
While network latency is often measured in fractions of a second, these seemingly 
infinitesimal delays have dramatic effects. One study found, for example, ‘that a 
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require the retrieval of information from servers located on foreign soil and the 
production of that information in the United States; and the practical effects 
that production would have on U.S. foreign relations.126 
A. Microsoft’s Arguments 
Microsoft argued that under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a), the government may re-
quire the disclosure of the content of electronic communications “only pursu-
ant to a warrant issued using the procedures described in the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure.”127 The rule in question, Rule 41, limits the geographical 
areas that may be covered by a search warrant.128 Federal courts do not have 
the authority to issue warrants for the search and seizure of property outside 
the territorial limits of the United States and therefore, Microsoft argued, the 
warrant in question was invalid to the extent that it required production of data 
from computer servers in Ireland.129 More broadly, Microsoft argued that under 
well-established Supreme Court precedent, statutes are presumed not to have 
any extraterritorial effect unless Congress clearly indicates that extraterritorial 
effect is intended.130 According to Microsoft’s appellate brief, “[t]he ‘cluster of 
ideas’ that attends the term ‘warrant’ includes the understanding that ordinarily 
‘United States district judges possess no extraterritorial jurisdiction’—no juris-
diction even beyond their own districts—and thus may not issue warrants for 
searches and seizures abroad.”131 Microsoft argued that it would be inconsistent 
with that precedent to interpret the SCA as authorizing extraterritorial warrants 
in any case.132 Microsoft emphasized the Irish government and other interna-
tional entities had already raised objections to a United States court purporting 
to authorize search and seizure of data stored in Ireland.133 These governments, 
clearly unsettled by the U.S. government’s perceived overreach, are under-
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 127 Id. at 470. 
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standably pushing back with data protection measures.134 
1. Amicus Brief supporting Microsoft 
In an amicus brief supporting Microsoft, Verizon Communications Inc., 
Cisco Systems, Inc., Hewlett-Packard Co., Ebay Inc., Salesforce.com, Inc., and 
Infor argued that the scope of the District Court’s ruling was excessive.135 The-
se entities argued that permitting the United States government to obtain uni-
lateral access to customers’ stored communications overseas could harm 
American businesses.136 In this line of reasoning, if it became known that the 
United States government could access information stored overseas, customers 
in foreign nations would be reluctant to entrust their data to any U.S.-based 
company.137 This problem, these tech entities argue, “affects not only the e-
mail service at issue in the case, but a host of other communication services, 
data storage providers, and technology companies.”138 Second, “[i]t will expose 
American businesses to legal jeopardy in other countries and damage Ameri-
can businesses economically.”139 Third, “[i]t will upset our international 
agreements and undermine international cooperation. And it will spur retalia-
tion by foreign governments, which will threaten the privacy of Americans and 
non-Americans alike.”140 Many of these corporations do business international-
ly and are therefore subject to the laws of foreign nations, thus, they are under-
standably concerned about the impact that an unfavorable ruling in the Mi-
crosoft case could potentially have on their ability to compete with foreign 
competitors. Furthermore, an unfavorable ruling could attenuate their justifica-
tions for resisting foreign governments request for similar data in the past. 
B. Government’s Arguments 
1. Possibly Ambiguous Statutory Language 
The Government argued that the SCA is at worst ambiguous on the question 
of the statute’s territorial application, and at best susceptible to a favorable in-
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terpretation for territoriality.141 The pertinent portion of the SCA states: 
A governmental entity may require the disclosure by a provider of electronic commu-
nication service of the contents of a wire or electronic communication, that is in elec-
tronic storage in an electronic communications system for one hundred and eighty 
days or less, only pursuant to a warrant issued using the procedures described in the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure … by a court of competent jurisdiction.142 
“Using the procedures described,” in the above excerpt, could have two very 
different meanings. Microsoft argued that this phrase incorporates all aspects 
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedures into section 2703(a), including the 
territorial limits on the scope of search warrants under Rule 41.143 The Gov-
ernment, in contrast, argued only the procedural aspects of Rule 41 was appli-
cable, and that the substantive rules governing the territorial scope of warrants 
are derived from other legal sources.144 Indeed, given the unique characteristics 
of electronic mail, to copy all the features of the search warrants covering 
physical evidence— limitations on territoriality included—onto electronic 
communications and other digital evidence would render the instrument im-
practicable.145 Both interpretations are plausible. 
2. No Extraterritoriality 
On the issue of the extraterritoriality, however, the Government’s argument 
is more persuasive. Directly contrary to Microsoft and the amici, the Govern-
ment argues that the SCA “does not implicate principles of extraterritoriali-
ty.”146 Microsoft argued that the presumption against territorial application in-
validates the warrant because warrants are limited to territories under U.S. ju-
risdiction.147 Indeed, “[w]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterri-
torial application, it has none…and reflect[s] the ‘presumption that United 
States law governs domestically but does not rule the world.’” 148 The Govern-
ment, in contrast, claims that it is asking Microsoft, a corporation headquar-
                                                 
 141 In re Microsoft, 15 F.Supp.3d at 470-72. 
 142 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a). 
 143 Brief for Appellant at 23, Microsoft Corp., No. 14-2985-cv (2nd Cir. Mar. 9, 2015). 
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tered in the United States, to issue certain commands from its computers, in the 
United States, in response to a United States subpoena.149 From this perspec-
tive, the Government argues, the fact United States computers will retrieve 
information from servers that happen to be located overseas is legally irrele-
vant. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
Defining the territory that is under United States jurisdiction is a key ele-
ment of this case.150 Territorial jurisdiction may refer to jurisdiction over cases 
arising in or involving persons residing within a defined territory.151 Territory 
is typically demarcated by physical boundaries.152 However, territory can en-
compass areas over which a government, one of its courts, or one of its subdi-
visions has jurisdiction.153 If a court does not have jurisdiction over the events 
or persons within it, then the court will not be able to bind someone to an obli-
gation or adjudicate their rights.154 Territorial jurisdiction can be waived, even 
unintentionally, by a defendant.155 In the case before the Second Circuit, if ter-
ritorial jurisdiction is defined by the location of the communications provider, 
then the Government’s act would be territorial since it is obtaining the data 
from Microsoft, a company operating in the United States, with its corporate 
headquarter in Washington State.156 On the other hand, if the territorial jurisdic-
tion is defined by where the communication is stored, then the Government’s 
actions would be extraterritorial, as could also be the case in Microsoft, with 
the data being stored in Ireland. 
A. District Court’s Ruling 
1. Statutory Ambiguity 
The District Court, agreeing with the Government’s position, pointed out 
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that the SCA’s language was ambiguous, and thus “a court must search be-
neath the surface of text that is ambiguous….”157 The Court explained, “when 
construing the meaning of a statute, this Court will ‘look not only to the partic-
ular statutory language, but also the design of the statute as a whole and to its 
object and policy.”158 The District Court noted that using the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure could plausibly be understood as meaning either that the 
entire rule is incorporated, or that only the procedural aspects of the warrant 
process from Rule 41 is incorporated, with more substantive rules derived from 
other sources.159 The District Court concluded that in light of this ambiguity, 
the Court must look at the “‘statutory structure, relevant legislative history, 
[and] congressional purposes.’”160 
2. Unique SCA Structure of Hybrid Warrant-Subpoena 
In order to avoid the strict territorial limits on conventional warrants, the 
Government argued that an SCA warrant is “not a conventional warrant; ra-
ther, the order is a hybrid: part search warrant and part subpoena.”161 In a semi-
nal case repeatedly cited by the government to demonstrate the authority of the 
court to compel disclosure of records located abroad with a subpoena, the Se-
cond Circuit held that “[i]t is no longer open to doubt that a federal court has 
the power to require the production of documents located in foreign countries 
if the court has in personam jurisdiction of the person in possession or control 
of the material.”162 The court reasoned that like a conventional search warrant, 
an SCA warrant is issued by a neutral magistrate upon a showing of probable 
cause.163 In contrast to a conventional warrant, however, an SCA warrant is 
executed like a subpoena:164 “a subpoena requires the recipient to produce in-
formation in its possession, custody, or control regardless of the location of 
that information.”165 That is, compelling an entity under the court’s jurisdiction 
                                                 
 157 In re Microsoft, 15 F.Supp.3d at 470. 
 158 Brief for the United States at 48, Microsoft Corp., No. 14-2985-cv (2d Cir. Mar. 9, 
2015) (citing Johnson v. United States, 123 F.3d 700, 702 (2nd Cir. 1997)). 
 159 See In re Microsoft, 15 F.Supp.3d at 470. 
 160 Id. at 471. 
 161 Id. at 471-74 (“if an SCA Warrant were treated like a conventional search warrant, it 
could only be executed abroad pursuant to a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (“MLAT”)). 
 162 Brief for the United States of America at 14, Microsoft Corp. v. United States, No. 
14-2985 (2d Cir. Dec. 8, 2014) (citing United States v. First Nat. City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 
900-01 (2d Cir. 1968)). 
 163 In re Microsoft, 15 F.Supp.3d at 471. 
 164 Id. 
 165 Id. at 472 (citing Marc Rich & Co., A.G. v. United States, 707 F.2d 663, 667 (2d Cir. 
1983) (“Neither may the witness resist the production of documents on the ground that the 
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to produce information under its control—even if located overseas—is a legal-
ly accepted practice in response to a subpoena. As noted earlier, a “subpoena 
requires the recipient to produce information in its possession, custody, or con-
trol regardless of the location of that information.”166 A SCA warrant is execut-
ed like a subpoena as it “does not involve government agents entering the 
premises of the [service provider] to search its servers and seize the e-mail ac-
count in question,”167 but rather, requires the recipient to produce the infor-
mation in its control. 
On the issue of control, Microsoft argues that the sender of the e-mail re-
mains in legal “constructive possession” and therefore, under United States v. 
Guterma, a subpoena would not be able to compel a “third-party naked posses-
sor to produce and deliver them.”168 In Guterma, the Court quashed a subpoena 
that sought to compel a company to produce the personal papers of its chair-
man.169 Where the company chairman’s personal papers were stored in a safe 
within the office and not governed by any specific terms of use, all users of 
Microsoft web e-mail services have to first agree to be bound by the compa-
ny’s terms of services, which basically confers possession of the e-mails to 
Microsoft so that the e-mails can become part of Microsoft’s files and rec-
ords.170 According to the Government, “the terms of service currently applica-
ble to Microsoft’s free email service do not suggest a mere caretaker or trust 
relationship. Rather, they assert Microsoft’s right to access or use the contents 
of its customers’ e-mails.”171 The District Court accepted this argument.172 
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 168 Brief for Appellant at 46-47, Microsoft Corp., No. 14-298-cv5 (2d Cir. Dec. 8, 2014) 
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you’re giving Microsoft the worldwide right, without charge, to use Content as nec-
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and separately, when “investigating” possible violations, “Microsoft or its agents 
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Id. 
 172 In re Microsoft, 15 F.Supp.3d at 477. 
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Lastly, Microsoft argues that “Marc Rich sits in uneasy tension with the pre-
sumption against extraterritoriality; it should not be extended to grant the Gov-
ernment the extraordinary power it seeks here.”173 That said, as Microsoft is a 
United States entity, on this reasoning, the information should be produced 
even though it is located in Ireland.174 
Even so, e-mails are oftentimes mistakenly characterized as private to the 
privacy advocates’ chagrin.175 Part of the problem when dealing with e-mail 
privacy is that many people generally have a misguided idea about how e-mail 
actually works.176 This misconception is fueled by reference to the most com-
mon analogy, which is that an e-mail is akin to a traditional letter that we 
would put in an envelope and seal. The act of sealing the letter in an envelope 
demonstrates an expectation of privacy that it would only be opened and read 
by the recipient.177 In reality, an e-mail operates more like a post-card.178 No 
one can reasonably expect the content of a postcard to remain private, since  its 
contents are in plain sight from the time it leaves the hands of the addressor. 
Yet, by simple analogy, we assume an expectation of privacy in the e-mails 
that we send. If people really want to keep their e-mails private, then users 
should encrypt them. Doing so would make the e-mail more akin to a tradi-
tional letter, since the encryption would, metaphysically speaking, serve as the 
envelope and represent the user’s expectation of privacy.179 
3. Legislative History 
The District Court also analyzed the SCA’s legislative history. The court 
agreed with the Government’s views that legislative history is not clear and 
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238 THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY [Vol. 24.1 
JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY 
could be read to support either party.180 However, a U.S. Senate report cited by 
the court, in discussing the nature of networked computers, acknowledged that 
“businesses of all sizes transmit their records to remote computers to obtain 
sophisticated data processing services.”181 This appears to reflect Congressional 
intent that the statute would cover information that would, at the very least, be 
transmitted and processed by computers located remotely and off site. 
A U.S. House of Representatives report was clearer about the territorial de-
marcation of the law. The report states: “the controls in Section 201 of the Act 
[which became the SCA] regarding access to stored wire and electronic com-
munications are intended to apply only to access within the territorial United 
States.”182 Despite this seemingly clear language, the District Court asserted 
that the statement was “ambiguous.”183 The District Court found that the case 
law relied upon by the Committee in reaching its conclusion on territoriality 
was flawed, because the case cited to addressed only the individual rights cre-
ated by ECPA and not the territorial reach of the government’s authority.184 
Even if Congress wrongly understood the cases cited in the legislative histo-
ry, its intent in passing the law would be defined by what it actually under-
stood, wrongly or not. More plausibly, the District Court noted that the Com-
mittee’s use of the word “access” did not clearly delineate whether it applied to 
“access to the location where the electronic data was stored or access to the 
location of the ISP in possession of the data.”185 As additional support for the 
claim that the relevant location is the location of the ISP, not the location of the 
server holding the data, the court cited the 2001 “USA PATRIOT Act,” passed 
in the aftermath of the terrorist attack against the United States on September 
11, 2001.186 
Section 108 of the USA PATRIOT Act amended the law “to authorize the 
court with jurisdiction over the investigation to issue the warrant directly, 
without requiring the intervention of its counterpart in the district where the 
ISP is located.”187 The amendment seems to indicate that Congress foresaw the 
                                                 
 180 In re Microsoft, 15 F.Supp.3d at 472-74. 
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41.”). 
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SCA Warrant’s utility as being qualitatively different from a conventional war-
rant. The counter argument would be that the PATRIOT Act expanded the 
scope of a given court’s warrants to include the entire United States, but did 
not purport to authorize extraterritorial application.188 But as even Microsoft 
recognized in its brief, “Congress did this because ‘the cross-jurisdictional na-
ture of the Internet’ led to ‘investigative delays’ as officers sought warrants in 
other districts.”189 Indeed, it would be a glaring legislative oversight if, after the 
devastating attacks on the U.S. homeland caused by foreign-based terrorists, 
Congress will limit the necessary expansion of investigative capabilities that 
could stem such attacks in ways that Microsoft suggest. 
In light of the ambiguities with the law, the Court made a balancing decision 
that weighed heavily on the practical considerations that it considered to tilt the 
scale in favor of the government’s position. Nonetheless, this raises questions 
as to whether this approach really is as practical as the Government makes it 
out to be. 
B. Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties 
One tangential aspect of the dispute in Microsoft is the availability and effi-
cacy of alternative means for the government to get access to data stored over-
seas. In Microsoft, there is no dispute that the company could technically and 
entirely, from within the United States, retrieve the requested information from 
Ireland.190 Webs of bilateral and multilateral agreements make up a system to 
facilitate criminal investigations and prosecutions in the nations that are parties 
to them.191 MLATs are the backbone of global cooperation among law en-
forcement agencies in cases that involve, but are not limited to, “locating and 
extraditing individuals, freezing assets, requesting searches and seizures, and 
taking testimony.”192 Here, the Government argued, and the District Court ac-
cepted, the claim that MLATs are often inefficient and slow.193 On appeal, Mi-
crosoft vigorously disputes this view, noting that as it is relevant to this partic-
ular case, the United States and Ireland have established procedures for han-
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dling international requests for information on an expedited basis.194 
As the world “flattens”195 digitally in the twenty-first century with ascent of 
the information revolution, more data is moving online—including that of 
criminals and their victims; the MLAT system has been slow in keeping pace 
with the rapid changes of data globalization.196 Indeed, the DOJ estimates that 
over the past decade the “number of [MLATs] requests for assistance from 
foreign authorities handled by the Criminal Division’s Office of International 
Affairs has increased by nearly 60 percent, and the number of requests for 
computer records has increased ten-fold.”197 In light of this growth in reliance 
on MLAT requests, much must be done to address the issues of jurisdiction 
over cross-border data transfers, privacy, and legitimate law enforcement needs 
for evidence.198 In this regard, Congress attempted to streamline MLAT in 
2009 by making it easier for DOJ to obtain evidence on behalf of foreign coun-
terparts.199 As early as 2014, the Obama Administration was considering new 
legislative proposals to further expedite the MLAT process.200 
Herein lies a key policy aspect of the problem raised by Microsoft concern-
ing the Government’s unilateral acquisition of foreign-stored data. MLATs 
typically include provisions that require the requesting party to agree not to 
bypass the MLAT by unilaterally obtaining evidence in the territory of the 
state where the evidence is located, and instead to only obtain such evidence in 
compliance with the law of that state.201 As relevant to Microsoft, the United 
States has an MLAT with Ireland, and Irish Law requires authorizations from 
an Irish District Court Judge to obtain the content of e-mails from an electronic 
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communications provider.202 
Some commentators have described MLATs as an expression of state sover-
eignty.203 Yet, there great ambiguity regarding state sovereignty within cyber-
space—if it even practicable to think in terms of traditional sovereignty in cy-
berspace. The Internet is a distributed network204 of networks that is transna-
tional in scope, with servers and routers that store, process, and switch infor-
mation located essentially anywhere in the world.205 Although a government 
must have the right to legitimately regulate activities that have a substantial 
effect within its territory, the cross-border nature of the Internet necessarily 
involves legal regimes that extend beyond the national law of a country. In-
deed, “international law has traditionally allowed countries nearly unlimited 
power to make law territorially subject only to some specific prohibitions, like 
the human rights norms against genocide and torture.”206 Moreover, “[t]he 
power to regulate extraterritoriality, while broad, is not unlimited: a state may 
make law governing ‘conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to 
have substantial effect within its territory...’”207 Given its multinational roots, it 
is reasonable that the appropriate legal framework to use in Internet govern-
ance would include elements of international law.208 However, an absolutist 
approach to state sovereignty in cyberspace is untenable for the preservation of 
the Internet as we know it. 
C. Conceptual Solutions 
According to Microsoft, “[e]lectronic letters do not become the caretaker’s 
records any more than physical letters do.”209 Rather, an e-mail provider is a 
mere “intermediary that makes e-mail communication possible,” and “not the 
intended recipient of the e-mails”; it is the “functional equivalent of a post of-
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fice.” 210 The reasoning behind this analogy rests on the possessory interests of 
the e-mail sender, rather than the e-mail provider, in the ‘electronic letter’ even 
after the e-mail is sent.211 The problem with this analogy as an argument in 
support of Microsoft’s position is that even if a letter does not become the 
caretaker’s record, the contents of a safe deposit box or of a letter inside a 
FedEx envelope would both nevertheless have to be disclosed if the Govern-
ment obtained a warrant based on probable cause.212 The statute’s intent could 
not be to create a safe harbor for digital evidence that may be illegal and to 
prevent law enforcement from reaching the evidence, no matter the stakes. 
Additionally, the technology of “packet switching,” the process used by 
computers to break apart and transmit data over the Internet, makes the trans-
mission of e-mails fundamentally different from letters.213 In the former, an e-
mail would first need to be disassembled and turned into “datagrams,”214 which 
would be roughly analogous to unsealing the letter, and sending the letter and 
envelope separately, and have it reassembled when it reaches its recipient.215 
Thus, the expectation of privacy that one would have in a letter sent through 
the post office versus e-mail is incongruous. In any case, this distinction high-
lights an ambiguity that the law has not directly addressed. 
One possible conceptual and technical approach to resolving the quagmire 
that e-mail providers are in, by having to serve as an intermediary, is “disin-
termediation.”216 In the context of e-mails, this is a process by which the e-mail 
service providers would be effectively removed from the relationship between 
the government seeking information and the actual targets of the government’s 
inquiry within the nation-state.217 Perhaps, e-mail providers ought to encrypt all 
data stored, processed, and transmitted. While this process could have been an 
easy solution in the late 1990s, just as the Internet was taking off, it is harder 
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now that the “Internet has made the network itself the intermediary for much 
conduct that we might have thought had no intermediary at all prior to the In-
ternet.”218 For this solution to work, international standards would have to be 
developed for e-mail encryption. 
Another possible, but radical approach is a total exit solution in which the 
targets, or Internet users, also leave the jurisdiction of the nation-state, or in 
common parlance, go “off the grid” by using private, non-commercial, serv-
ers.219 Consequently, the data would not be subject to any country’s sovereign 
jurisdiction.220 
The current approach taken by some governments to access digital evidence 
is a process that could be called “source-adhesion.” This is a process by which 
the local intermediary would be required to maintain its records or at least cop-
ies of them—including e-mails, in its home country—which would only be 
accessible by the government upon clearly stipulated and accountable methods 
to minimize the use of such data.221 However, with current technologies, this 
technique would result in greater costs to technology companies, and could 
cause an increase in network latency and significant inefficiencies in the global 
Internet network.222 
A defining feature of the new digital age is data permanence. The growing 
importance of data collection and big data for various legitimate and less legit-
imate social, economic, and military purposes, however, is also giving rise to 
data nationalism.223 Thus the MLAT system must be updated to provide re-
course to the ongoing trend of data centralization and a consolidation of the 
Internet’s network hardware behind territorial boundaries.224 
As the District Court and other legal commentators have suggested, the 
MLAT system could be improved in many ways.225 Yet, the highly discretion-
ary language found in existing MLATs—even between friendly nations such 
as the United States and Great Britain, which effectively gives the country 
holding the data an unrestricted ability to deny requests for assistance—creates 
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a disincentive to use MLATs as a means to acquire digital evidence.226 Fur-
thermore, if the hybrid subpoena-warrant theory is denied, criminals could 
evade SCA warrants by simply giving false information and by using tech-
niques to obscure routing with e-mail providers to induce those providers to 
place the e-mails in an offshore server.227 
A similar argument was advanced in the Australian libel case of Dow Jones 
& Co. v. Gutnick: “Dow Jones submitted that it was preferable that the pub-
lisher of material on the World Wide Web be able to govern its conduct ac-
cording only to the law of the place where it maintained its web servers, unless 
that place was merely adventitious or opportunistic.”228 The Australian court 
disagreed and found, within the context of an action for libel, liability would be 
determined where the libelous speech was felt. 229 In Microsoft, the United 
States was seeking information about a crime that affected the United States. 
Therefore, its ability to obtain the required information should not be based on 
“adventitious or opportunistic” factors affecting where the data are located.230 
That said, if U.S. law enforcement asserts the authority to obtain the content of 
customers’ data stored outside its territorial jurisdiction, foreign governments 
will be more likely to assert the same authority to obtain data of Americans 
citizens who come into contact with foreign law. 
To put these matters into perspective, the former head of the National Secu-
rity Agency and of the U.S. Cyber Command, General Keith Alexander, has 
called the breach of American secrets via cyber espionage “the greatest transfer 
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of wealth in history.”231 Whether the United States Government will be able to 
effectively deal with these types of problems through bilateral diplomacy is 
questionable.  Instead, an efficient system for retrieving information from 
overseas is needed to assist law enforcement in this effort.232 
The Internet may have been “borderless” and capable of respecting anonym-
ity at its inception.233 Indeed in the 1990s, the web was epitomized by its “in-
stant and universal communication, geographic anonymity, and decentralized 
routing,” but these egalitarian principles gave way to criminals using it to hide 
their tracks online and for “computer users to get illegal information from 
computers outside the nation.”234 The Internet has consequently transformed 
into something else. A famous 2000 case revealed that the old conception of 
the borderless Internet was inaccurate; Yahoo! was confronted by claims from 
the French legal system that its auction of Nazi memorabilia violated French 
Law.235 Yahoo! originally claimed that its servers were not located in France 
and that it could not tell where the requests to view the items were coming 
from. 236 In fact, however, the case revealed that “Yahoo!’s servers … were 
actually located on a website in Stockholm. Yahoo! had placed a constantly 
updated ‘mirror’ copy of its U.S. site in Sweden to speed access to the site in 
Europe.”237 Additionally, it was realized at that time that it is indeed possible in 
most cases to determine where a user was physically located.238 A solution to 
the problem, as discussed in Microsoft may be to mandate the use of geograph-
ical identification on the Internet.239 This would allow service providers to store 
data according to the location of the user.240 The more this practice is imple-
                                                 
 231 John Seabrook, Network Insecurity, THE NEW YORKER, May 20, 2013, 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/05/20/network-insecurity. 
 232 See generally Exec. Order No. 13,694, 80 Fed. Reg. 18077, 18077 (Apr. 2, 2015) 
(imposing economic sanctions on companies that directly benefitted from cyber-hackers). 
 233 See generally The Role of Standards in the Growth of Global Economic Commerce: 
Hearing before the Subcomm. on Sci., Tech., and Space of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., 
and Transp., 106th Cong. 18 (1999) (statement of Andrew B. Whinston, Director, Ctr. for 
Res. in Elec. Commerce). 
 234 Jack Goldsmith & Timothy Wu, Digital Borders, LEGAL AFFAIRS, Jan.-Feb. 2006 
[hereinafter Goldsmith & Wu, Digital Borders], http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/January-
February-2006/feature_goldsmith_janfeb06.msp. 
 235 See Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et, L’antisemitisme, 145 F.Supp.2d 
1168, 1171-72 (N.D. Cal. 2001). 
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 237 Goldsmith & Wu, Digital Borders, supra note 234. 
 238 See Dan Jerker B. Svantesson, “Imagine there’s no countries . . .”-Geo-identification, 
the law and the not so borderless internet, EPUBLICATIONS@BOND, Feb. 2007, at 1-2, 
http://epublications.bond.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1131&context=law_pubs; see 
also Goldsmith & Wu, Digital Borders, supra note 234. 
 239 See generally Svantesson, supra note 238, at 4. 
 240 Goldsmith & Wu, Digital Borders, supra note 234 
IP addresses (like “192.168.0.55”) don’t readily reveal a computer user’s physical 
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mented, the fewer problems of the sort presented here will arise. 
1. A New Matrix 
Legal scholars and commentators have attempted to propose the optimal mix 
of legal instruments for data recovery in piecemeal. For Law Professor Orin 
Kerr, the solution is to revise the SCA so that it could help to distinguish be-
tween: 
[P]eople in the [United States] who use U.S. providers that just happen to store their 
contents on [foreign servers] (those e-mails should be obtainable with a U.S. warrant), 
and people abroad whose providers store e-mails abroad but [may] also [just happen 
to] have an office in the U.S. (those e-mails should be obtained through MLATs).241 
There are obviously some gaps in Kerr’s scenarios. For instance, it seems 
that the citizenship of the suspect, not merely her physical location, should 
matter. But this leaves the issue of what should be done with e-mails of a non-
citizen residing in the United States, but who has an account with a foreign 
provider that uses U.S.-based data warehouse storage. The sound idea behind 
Professor Kerr’s proposal is to tie the use of MLATs to the situations in which 
the interests of the foreign nation are strongest. 
The Internet is a distributed network, and the Internet ecosystem is constant-
ly shifting. As part of that evolution, there has been a raft of new measures 
making their way through foreign governments such as Russia, Brazil, India, 
and China to impose data localization requirements, under which data relating 
to a given country’s nationals must remain within that county.242 These kinds of 
developments could have the eventual effect of fragmenting the Internet. In 
support of Microsoft in the Second Circuit, Verizon argues that the District 
Court’s interpretation of the SCA will encourage this type of activity, and that 
Congress—not the judiciary—needs to make an express decision to extend the 
SCA extraterritorially.243 Otherwise, if data localization becomes the norm, law 
enforcement-to-law enforcement cooperation under MLATs will remain the 
only means for the U.S. government to obtain data located abroad. 
                                                                                                                 
location. But a savvy user can determine that location by sending ‘tracing’ packets 
over the Internet . . . when the databases are cross-referenced and analyzed, the loca-
tion of Internet users can be determined with over 99 percent accuracy at the country 
level. 
Id. 
 241 See Kerr, Legal Protections, supra note 13. 
 242 See Gillian Wong, U.S. Business Group Urges China to Ease Data Restrictions, 
WALL ST. J. (Apr. 13, 2015, 10:19 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-business-group-
urges-china-to-ease-data-restrictions-1428974445. 
 243 Brief of Verizon Commc’n Inc., et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant at 14, 
Microsoft Corp., No. 14-2985-cv (2d Cir. Dec. 15, 2014). 
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While it is clear that Congress needs to act, a more comprehensive and nu-
anced approach is necessary.244 
 
 
 
SCA WARRANT/MLAT FRAMEWORK  
(Is the U.S. government required to use MLATs?) 
 
 Subpoena (S) Court Order (C) Warrant (W) 
U.S.-Co. data stored 
domestically 
No245 N/A No246 
U.S.-Co. data  
stored abroad  
No247 N/A No/Yes248 
Non-U.S. Co. with 
subsidiary in U.S. 
N/A N/A N/A 
Non-U.S. Co. in 
foreign territory 
N/A N/A N/A 
 
  
                                                 
 244 Brief of Appellant at 56, Microsoft Corp., No. 14-2985-cv (2d Cir. Dec. 8, 2014) 
(according to Microsoft, “Congress might seek to authorize the extraterritorial application of 
§ 2703(a) only for investigations of certain crimes and national security matters. It might 
extend § 2703(a) to reach e-mails overseas, but only those belonging to U.S. citizens and 
permanent residents. Indeed, pending Senate bills would do just that. See Law Enforcement 
Access to Data Stored Aboard Act, S. 2871, 113th Cong. §§ 2(4), (3)(a)(2), (3)(a)(5) 
(2014).”). 
 245 Somewhat paradoxically, the government’s unilateral use of the hybrid warrant may 
be the most privacy protecting option since subpoena would require a showing of probable 
cause and other countries privacy standards may not be as high. Hill, supra note 16. 
 246 Id. 
 247 In re Microsoft, 15 F.Supp.3d at 477. 
 248 This quadrant is being decided by the Microsoft case. 
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SCA WARRANT/MLAT FRAMEWORK 
(Should the U.S. government be required to use MLATs?) 
 
 Subpoena (S) 
 
Court Order (C) Warrant (W) 
U.S.-Co. data stored 
domestically 
No249 N/A No250 
U.S.-Co. data  
stored abroad 
No251 N/A No252 
Non-U.S. Co. with 
subsidiary in U.S. 
No253 N/A No/Yes254 
Non-U.S. Co. in 
foreign territory 
N/A N/A N/A 
 
2. U.S.-company with data stored abroad (warrant) 
Accepting as the premise that the principle of territoriality should be defined 
in terms of the company’s location, the District Court and the Government 
have a stronger argument for the validity of using a warrant for obtaining the 
content of an electronic communication from a U.S.-based company. The 
SCA, as written, appears to support the government’s authority to unilaterally 
obtain customer records or information from a U.S. company, for records that 
may be stored abroad, by way of a SCA warrant.255 A warrant is not a subpoe-
na; but the unique features of digital data, in particular an e-mail, in terms of 
how it is stored, processed, and transmitted should be taken into account. This 
distinction should support the treatment of SCA warrants as a hybrid of both a 
warrant and a subpoena, as suggested by the District Court.256 While the data 
                                                 
 249 In re Microsoft, 15 F.Supp.3d at 477. 
 250 Hill, supra note 16. 
 251 Brief of Media Org. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant at 32, Microsoft Corp., 
No. 14-2985-cv (2d Cir. Dec. 15, 2014). 
 252 Kerr, Legal Protections, supra note 13. 
 253 Brief of Media Org. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant at 14, Microsoft Corp., 
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 255 Privacy Law – Stored Communications Act – District Court Holds that SCA Warrant 
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1019. 
 256 Brief for the United States of America at 23-24, Microsoft Corp., No. 14-2985-cv (2d 
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would be coming from abroad, in practical terms the distant records would be 
retrieved from a company headquartered within the United States, and doing so 
would not require any physical intrusion by United States law enforcement or 
other personnel onto the territory of the foreign sovereign. 
3. Non-U.S. Company with subsidiary in the United States 
Territoriality for purposes of the SCA must be clearly defined in terms of 
the location of the company that controls access to the data, and not the com-
munication itself.257 In light of the distributed nature of stored data on the In-
ternet, defining the relevant territoriality in terms of the location of the data 
would create significant problems. Among other things, the location of the data 
can change over time, based on the business decisions or mere whims of the 
company storing them. Accordingly, the principle would work both ways: 
U.S.-based and non-U.S. based. If the U.S. government wanted information 
relating to an Internet user using a Chinese Internet company such as Baidu, it 
should have to request it through the MLAT.258 Yet if Baidu’s data center is 
serving a particular client determined to be located within the United States, 
the U.S. government should be able to procure such data through a warrant. 
However, in the case of a subpoena in which only metadata may be disclosed, 
there is no meaningful invasion of privacy. Therefore, the government should 
not be required to use the MLAT process. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The two scenarios offered at the outset of this note do not exactly mimic the 
Microsoft case, but they serve to underscore the very real challenges that Inter-
net users, Internet companies, and governments around the world must contend 
with due to digital globalization. In the Microsoft case, the United States and 
Ireland have good relations, generally;259 even so, the case has provoked con-
troversy, and the practical considerations of concern to both governments as 
well as to the parties must be given more weight. While a government must 
have legitimate access to stored digital communications, giving it unfettered 
access to data stored in other countries—which the District Court effectively 
did—does not provide adequate consideration to the wide-ranging economic, 
                                                                                                                 
Cir. Mar. 9, 2015). 
 257 In re Microsoft, 15 F.Supp.3d at 470. 
 258 BAIDU, http://www.baidu.com/ (last visited Sep. 13, 2015). 
 259 U.S. Relations with Ireland, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, (Apr. 3, 2014), 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3180.htm (“U.S. relations with Ireland have long been 
based on common ancestral ties and shared values, and emigration has been a foundation of 
the U.S.-Irish relationship.”). 
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political, and social impacts that this approach will have on the Internet. 
The practical effects of how the “district court’s ruling will encourage for-
eign governments to sidestep their own MLAT commitments and unilaterally 
seek data stored in the United States from providers that operate in their juris-
diction”260 is perhaps Microsoft’s strongest policy point. There is, conceivably, 
a slippery slope in which the world’s superpower, the United States, in bypass-
ing international law concerning cyberspace, would precipitate digital lawless-
ness by encouraging other countries to disregard international norms in favor 
of each country’s narrow interests, however defined.261 
On the other hand, it is unlikely that anything the United States does will 
motivate nations such as China and Russia to change their laws promoting data 
nationalism and more government control over user data. These nations, which 
are fairly characterized as somewhere between rivals and adversaries of the 
United States in the geopolitical sense, and are adversely disposed to the ideas 
of democratic and human rights, will not change their attitude towards the 
availability of “their” data to the United States based on the scope of hybrid 
warrants/subpoenas under the SCA.  Furthermore, the persuasiveness of Mi-
crosoft’s argument is attenuated by the fact that “during the prior three years 
that the Dublin datacenter was in operation,262 Microsoft never raised this ob-
jection as a basis to avoid compliance with the SCA.”263 This interesting fact 
raises the probability that Microsoft’s about-face objection to the SCA is moti-
vated less by a sudden discovery of legal rights or high principal than by the 
economic ramifications caused by National Security Agency contractor Ed-
ward Snowden’s leaks—with business losses estimated to being between $35 
billion and $180 billion, depending on the metrics.264 As the government noted, 
                                                 
 260 Brief for the United States of America at 59, Microsoft Corp., No. 14-2985-cv (2d 
Cir. Dec. 8, 2014). 
 261 Brief of Media Orgs. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant at 28, Microsoft Corp., 
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At oral argument, Microsoft pointed out to the court that just that week, Chinese au-
thorities raided four Microsoft locations. The authorities took servers from Mi-
crosoft’s offices and “demanded a password to seek e-mail information in the United 
States … Microsoft refused because the Chinese government did not have jurisdic-
tion over e-mails located outside China. 
Id. 
 262 Indeed, Microsoft’s Dublin datacenter has been operational since September 2010. 
See Brief for the United States of America at 45, Microsoft Corp., No. 14-2985-cv (2d Cir. 
Mar. 9, 2015). 
 263 Id. at 3-4. 
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“the protection of the foreign economic interests of the United States must be 
left to the appropriate departments of our government.”265 
Either way, Internet companies are in a difficult bind, and the future of the 
Internet is sliding towards a bordered reality. What is needed is an international 
consensus on how matters described in the case and scenarios may be resolved 
in a reasonable manner that protects data privacy while not becoming ensnared 
in the more complex debate over government surveillance. Coupled with effi-
cacious use of encryption, the proposed new framework set out above should 
be governed by a comprehensive data service agreement that creates narrowly 
tailored exceptions that both facilitate legitimate law enforcement needs, while 
balancing the peoples’ reasonable expectations of privacy over communica-
tions in cyberspace.266 
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